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that revocation of petitioner's license to dispense controlled
substances is tantamount to depriving him of his lifetime
profession for dispensing therapeutic doses of drugs to one, long
time customer who was entitled to the drugs by physicians'
diagnosis and oral approval of refills. The order is thus
arbitrary and capricious particularly when compared to penalties
imposed in other cases involving licensed pharmacists.

Under

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (Supp. 1991), the appellate
court must grant relief if the agency action is contrary to the
agency's prior practice, and substantially prejudices the party
seeking judicial review, unless the agency demonstrates a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency.
2.

The Director was present at the proceedings and

participated in the examination of the petitioner.

Thus, the

Director was an advocate, not a tribunal, and Petitioner was
deprived of due process of law.

Constitutional questions are

characterized as questions of law to which a correction-of-error
standard of review applies giving no deference to the agency's
decision.

See Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n..

817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991).
3.

The findings were not signed by the presiding officer,

who was the ALJ designated to conduct the proceeding, as required
by Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10(l) (1988).

The Director, who

was neither the presiding officer nor the agency head, signed the
Order adopting the findings.

This is a question of law to which

a correction-of-error standard applies.

See Morton Intern. Inc.
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v. Auditing Pi v.. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
4.

No concurrence of the State Board of Pharmacy was

obtained as required by Utah Code Annotated § 58-1-16 (1988),
although two members of the Board appeared to submit the
findings, conclusions and recommended order.

This is a question

of law to which a correction-of-error standard applies. See
Morton, 814 P.2d at 585.

STATUTES
The following Utah Code Annotated statutes are relevant to
the consideration of this appeal.
58-1-16

Notice of disciplinary action — Hearing officers
— Director's powers — Evidence.

(1) (a) Before suspending, revoking, placing on
probation, or refusing to renew a license, and before
issuing a cease and desist order, the division shall
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act;
however, before proceeding under the provisions of
Section 63-46b-20, providing for emergency adjudicative
proceedings, the division shall review the proposed
action with a committee of licensees appointed by the
licensing board established under this title for the
profession of the person against whom the action is
proposed.
(b) By complying with the procedures and
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the director may
hold or cause to be held administrative hearings
regarding any other matter affecting the division or
the activities of any person authorized to practice his
occupation or profession under this title.
(2) (a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held
before an appropriate presiding officer, as designated
by the director.
(b) The presiding officer shall make written
recommendations for action, findings of fact, and
conclusions of law.
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(c) The director, with the concurrence of the
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on
the recommendations but is not bound to follow the
recommendations of the presiding officer.
(d) If the director does not issue an order within
ten days after the presiding officer has made the
recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding
officer shall become the order.
(3) (a) The director or his designee may administer
oaths, issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of papers, books,
accounts, documents, and evidence.
(b) Any party to any action permitted under this
section may issue subpoenas and compel the attendance
of witnesses and the production of papers, books,
accounts, documents, and evidence.
63-46b-2. Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
. . .

(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of
individuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the
agency is vested by statute.
. . .

(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head,
or an individual or body of individuals designated
by the agency head, by the agency's rules, or by
statute to conduct an adjudicative proceeding.
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not
compromised, an agency may substitute one
presiding officer for another during any
proceeding.
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer
at one phase of a proceeding need not continue as
presiding officer through all phases of a
proceeding.
63-46b-10(l)
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or
after the filing of any post-hearing papers permitted
by the presiding officer, or within the time required
by any applicable statute or rule of the agency, the
4
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presiding officer shall sign and issue an order that
includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence
of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on
facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's
conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for the
presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the
agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for
reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or
judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties;
13-1-12.

Order by hearing officer or body — Appeals
of order to the division director or the
executive director.

(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding,
the administrative law judge or an occupational board
or representative committee with assistance from the
administrative law judge, shall issue an order.
(b) The order may be appealed to the executive
director or the division director for review.
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason to
fairly review or rule upon an order of the
administrative law judge or a board or committee, the
executive director shall review and rule upon the
order.
63-46b-16.

Judicial review - Formal adjudicative
Proceedings.

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to
5
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follow prescribed procedure;
(h) the agency action is:
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the
Department of Commerce commenced proceedings against the
Petitioner, Pickett, by "Notice of Agency Action" to impose
"appropriate sanctions" against Pickett for alleged violations of
the licensing act and statutes related to dispensing controlled
substances.

After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge,

the division issued orders revoking Pickett's license to dispense
controlled substances and requiring Servus Drug Co. to employ
another pharmacist to deal with controlled substances.

Pickett

appealed the order to the Executive Director, who affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A "Notice of Agency Action" was served upon Pickett
notifying him that he was entitled to a hearing and that "The
presiding officer at the hearing will be J. Steven Eklund,
Administrative Law Judge, Department of Commerce." (R 67).
Present at the hearing on May 26, 1992, were the ALJ and two
members of the State Board of Pharmacy.
of the Board were absent.

Three remaining members

David E. Robinson, the Director of the
6
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Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing was present.
(R 35).
The Board's unsigned Findings of Fact are as follows (R 3637) :
1. Respondent Jack W. Pickett (Hereinafter,
Respondent) is, and at all times relevant to this
proceeding has been, licensed to practice as a
pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances in the
State of Utah. Respondent has been a licensed
pharmacist since approximately 1954. Respondent Servus
Drug Co. (hereinafter, Servus Drug Co.) is, and at all
times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed as
a pharmacy and a dispensary for controlled substances
in the State of Utah. This record does not reflect the
exact date those licenses were issued. Respondent is
employed by Servus Drug Co., a business which is owned
by Respondent's wife.
2. On twelve occasions between May 20, 1991 and
July 30, 1991, Respondent dispensed various dosages of
either Tranxene, a Schedule IV controlled substance,
[or] Esgic, a Schedule III controlled
substance, without a physician's authorization to do
so. On occasions, Respondent dispensed medications in
either unlabeled prescription vials or a paper bag
bearing no labels or instructions.
3. There is a lack of sufficient evidence
Respondent made false or forged prescriptions as to
dispense the above-stated controlled substances or
other medications. Further, there is a lack of
sufficient evidence to conclude Respondent knew Mr.
Schriver was drug dependent. Respondent acknowledges
his prescriptive practices were improper and he failed
to adequately document the controlled substances or
other medications which he dispensed. Respondent often
dispensed those controlled substances or other
medications in the manner requested by Mr. Schriver,
who often suggested the use of either unlabeled vials
or other inappropriate containers.
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent
has improperly dispensed controlled substances or other
medications to other individuals. Respondent asserts
he has taken remedial measures to address the
acknowledged deficiencies in his practices now under
review. However, there is a lack of substantial
evidence as the specific nature of corrective measures
7
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Respondent may have undertaken in that regard.
Pickett testified at the hearing responding to questions of
his counsel; cross examination by Ms. Welch, respondent's
counsel; answered questions of a Board Member; the ALJ; and then
the Director of the Division, Mr. Robinson aggressively
interrogated Pickett (Tr 2).

Since petitioners challenge the

propriety of the participation by the Director, we copy herein
the questions and answer resulting from examination by the
Director (Tr 20-33):
THE COURT:

Mr.

Robinson?

E X A M I N A T I O N

BY MR. ROBINSON:
Q. Mr. Pickett, my name is David Robinson. I'm
the director of the Division. I'm not a pharmacist, so
my questions come from not being a pharmacist.
MR. ROBINSON: Does he have a copy of this
document (indicating)?
MS. WELCH: That's correct.
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) Look at this document, the
stipulation. I'd like to ask you some questions about
it.
A. Okay.
Q. On the bottom of Page 1 it says, on or about
May 20th, 1991, you dispensed 30 doses of Tranxene, a
Schedule 4 substance, to Todd Schryver. Was there a
prescription for that drug?
A. Originally there was.
Q. What was that original prescription?
A. I would have to go back on my records.
Q. What's your recollection?
A. I would say within six months.
Q. On May the 25th — on Page 2, it says, on May
the 25th, 1991, he came in again for Tranxene and you
forged a prescription.
A. No. That was — that's a case of updating.
In other words — I don't see the reason they put
forging there, it's because I didn't have prior
approval.
Q. Was there — did you create a document?
A. Well, what you have to do is that after the
prescription has been filled for certain length of time
8
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or a number of times, you got to update your record.
Q. How did you update the record? What did you
do?
A. What you do is —
Q. Are we talking about a computer record or are
we talking about a paper record?
A. Written record.
Q. So what did you do to create a record to
support this? Did you fill out a prescription for him?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. And you signed the doctor's name to it?
A. Just the same as if it had been phoned in.
Q. And you did not talk with the doctor?
A. No, not until afterwards. That's my problem.
These were okayed afterwards.
Q. What is Tranxene for, what kind of drug?
A. He was using it for anxiety. That's the
mildest form of it.
Q. And what was his diagnosis?
A. That was what it was diagnosed for, was
anxiety.
Q. Did you see the medical record?
A. No. But that's what he told me.
Q. He told you that?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. The physician didn't tell you?
A. No.
Q. He told you?
A. He told me that.
Q. Do you always rely upon what your patients
tell you?
A. You just about have to.
Q. On June the 14th, 1991 — well, let me ask you
a question. On May the 20th you gave him 30 doses of
Tranxene. Do you remember what he was — what his
dosage was, how much?
A. Three times a day.
Q. Three times a day. Five days later when he
should have taken 15 doses you gave him 30 more?
A. I think that was when he wanted to go to Bear
Lake. I think that was the time. I think that's the
only time.
Q. How long was he going to go to Bear Lake?
A. He was going to be gone a week.
Q. He already had a five-day supply unused,
didn't he?
A. Yeah. But that's less than a week.
Q. On June the 14th, 1991, you gave him 30 doses
of Esgic without a physician's order to do so. Why was
that? I mean, you had no prescription for Esgic. What
was his diagnosis?
A. Again, he had had a prescription.
9
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Q. How long?
A. Probably on that one probably for — oh, maybe
two years previously he had.
Q. Two years previously to that he had had a
prescription?
A. He'd seen the doctor in the meantime, and each
time —
Q. How do you know? Did he tell you?
A. No, When we're working quite closely with the
doctors, we pretty well know when they go in. He went
for anxiety in the meantime, so he had to see him then.
Q. What's Esgic for?
A. It's just for pain.
Q. And what was the pain caused by?
A. He complained of backache.
Q. Complained of backache?
A. Un-huh (affirmative).
Q. And you gave him 30 doses on June 14th. What
was his — how much was he to take each day?
A. Three times a day.
Q. Three times a day. And yet he didn't fill
that again until July 5th for 30 doses. He would have
used those 30 doses of Esgic in ten days. So on June
the 24th he would have been without Esgic, right?
A. If he were using it properly.
Q. If he were using the prescribed doses; is that
right?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. June the 24th. And yet he didn't come back to
you for 11 days later. Tell me, Mr. Pickett, does that
suggest to you that he may have been getting his drugs
some other place.
A. No, not at all.
Q. Did you ever think about that?
A. No, because people do that all the time.
Q. Was it possible that he was getting drugs from
another source?
A. Things are always possible, but not —
Q. Do you know for sure he was not?
A. No. I know for sure, as far as my knowledge
is concerned, he was not.
Q. Mr. Pickett, when you look at this pattern of
you supplying him drugs and you look at the daily doses
he was to be taking, do you see a discrepancy here,
showing that either he went too long or he went too
short?
A. No, because we run into that all the time
especially on paid medication.
Q. If you look at this pattern and you calculate
the number of doses he was to take of the drug and you
look at the frequency with which he filled them, have
you noticed the fact that they don't necessarily follow
10
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a pattern, sometimes they're longer and sometimes
they're shorter, have you noticed that?
A. Yes. But people with pain medication or
backache do that. In other words, they don't use it
every day. When they need it, they use it. When they
don't, they don't.
Q. On July 15th he comes to you and gets 30 doses
of Soma. What's Soma for?
A. That's a muscle relaxant for the back.
Q. That's a relaxant?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. And that again was without a physician's
order?
A. That was the same type of situation
originally.
Q. Two years?
A. Originally they had prescribed a hundred at a
time.
Q. How long ago?
A. Well, they gave him that before they gave him
the Esgic.
Q. So it was more than two years?
A. Well, originally it could have been more than
two years.
Q. How old is Mr. Schryver?
A. Oh, 30, 35 — about 30, 35, somewhere in that
vicinity.
Q. Does he work?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). He's working.
Q. Was this paid for by insurance or by him,
personally?
A. No, by him personally. In fact, most the time
it was charged.
Q. Mr. Pickett, when Ms. Welch asked you the
question — she asked you the question, what was the
risk? Do you remember your answer to that? What was
the risk of dispensing these drugs without a
prescription? Do you remember your answer?
A. Always the possibility of someone running into
problems.
Q. That wasn't your first answer. What was your
first response?
A. No, I don't remember it.
Q. Your first response was not to the patient's
welfare at all, your response was that — you said that
the doctor will say no. That was your first view of
the risk, that the doctor would say no and you'd be
hung out to dry. Not of the patient's welfare, that
was not the first thought that came to your mind. Is
that curious?
A. You're always taught to take care of Number
One.
11
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Q. You first?
A. Who's Number One?
Q. When Ms. Welch asked you the question about
your continuing education, you indicated that you had
made no attempts to remain current with continuing
professional education, and then you said, quote, they,
referring to the pharmacy association and the state,
they haven't done a good job in keeping us up to date.
A. On state law, that's true.
Q. Is that our responsibility to keep you advised
of the law?
A. No, it isn't your responsibility.
Q. Whose is it?
A. The think is, when —
Q. Whose is it?
A. When the legislature meets, it's impossible to
keep track of the changes that occur, and they should
advise you of the changes, the pharmacy board should,
or the state board of pharmacy should, advise you of
those changes. There's no education system within the
state or within the pharmacy that keeps you up to date
on that.
Q. What's your responsibility to go to — how
long since you've been to State Pharmacy Association
meeting?
A. Quite some time.
Q. Are you aware of any education classes they
conduct at those meetings?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). Yeah.
Q. Would that be a good place to become informed?
A. Probably. Probably.
Q. Did you feel any need to do that?
A. Well, when you're working the store alone and
with no relief help, it's about impossible to attend
meetings.
Q. When we began this, you talked about your —
you did this to service your customer. How long have
you been at Servus Drug?
A. Close to 20 years.
Q. Twenty years ago at Servus Drug were you one
of the primary prescription fillers in the city of
Bountiful?
A. Not quite, not quite. There were quite a —
there were a number.
Q. That's changed dramatically over the years
with the introduction of Smith's, Albertson's, and
Shopko.
A. Oh, sure.
Q. And that's had an impact on your business.
A. Sure.
Q. How much has the fact that these chains have
come in and those large stores comes in and impact your
12
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business, how much did that play in your decision to
try to give these products to Mr. Schryver without the
necessary protections, simply because you were
competing and you were feeling the competition?
A. I don't think that was a problem. I never
considered it that way. I've always considered right
from the start to be as much a service as we can to our
customers.
Q. Even if it means violating the law?
A. We haven't. The law enforcement has varied.
Q. Well, Mr. Pickett, you were charged with a
felony, weren't you?
A. Yes. But that was mainly —
Q. And you plead guilty to a felony — or no
contest?
A. I didn't plead guilty, that's no contest.
Q. Is that different than a plea of guilty?
MR. FADEL: May I intervene? The diversion
agreement is not a conviction, it's an agreement that
they would set aside the information and the indictment
if he met the conditions of the diversion agreement.
So it's true he was charged with a felony, he made no
plea to it, and it's not considered a conviction. I'll
just read briefly from the statute that says that
diversion is not a conviction. And if the case is
dismissed, the matter should be treated as if the
charge had never been filed.
MS. WELCH: And that was the penal code section
772-2 on subsequent 772-8.
MR. ROBINSON: Ms. Welch, I'm not sure the Board
and the Division would consider it as though the charge
had never been filed, that may be for future criminal
reference. I don't think the Board and the Division
would do so and consider it a fact in argument. We
commonly refer to the fact equating a no contest plea,
a guilty — equal to a guilty plea.
MS. WELCH: Well, my understanding is a nolo
contendere plea is equal to no criminal liability, but
it does create that civil admission.
MR. ROBINSON: Let me go on, if I can.
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) You refer to a Dr. Guymon.
Who is Dr. Guymon?
A. Guymon. G-U-Y- —
Q. Okay. I have that.
MR. WHITE: Guymon and Clark.
MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, one of the things that
troubles me, as I hear Mr. Pickett, is that I'm not
sure that he understands the significance of what's
been done here.
THE COURT: Well, the ~
MR. ROBINSON: The reason I ask that is I have a
couple of exhibits that I think would be helpful to him
13
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that I don't think bear on the action that would be
taken in this case. It might be helpful to him in this
matter if I could use them, but I would look to your
direction*
THE COURT: Well, you say they don't bear on the
action to be taken in this case.
MR. ROBINSON: They don't bear, I don't think, on
anything that the Board would recommend.
THE COURT: What would they — why would we be
making reference to these?
MR. ROBINSON: Because of the fact that doctor —
or Mr. Pickett has said that he, in response to my
questions, doesn't — has not considered at all the
obtaining of drugs from another source and the affect
that that might have upon a patient.
THE COURT: What do you intend to offer? What's
the nature of what it is you want to present?
MR. ROBINSON: I would like to show him some
examples of similar cases and the affect of those
cases.
THE WITNESS: Let me put it this way, too. When
that happens, you see evidence of it from the person.
You see that he's slurring his words, you see that he's
having difficulty walking, you see it in his
coordination.
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) Do addicts always appear
that way?
A. I've never known one that hasn't, unless
they've had enough time between when they have taken
something and when they see you.
MR. ROBINSON: I'll withdraw my suggestion.
Mr. Robinson continued his examination following
questions by the ALJ and the answer of Pickett that
"Apparently he (Schryver) was getting drugs somewhere
else." (Tr 34-35).
BY MR. ROBINSON:
Q. He was?
A. Apparently so.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Well, it's on the information I have here that
says he was using Darvocet. I've never dispensed
Darvocet to him.
Q. Paragraph 8 on Page 7 of this petition starts
with the sentence, because Respondent dispensed
controlled substances to a drug dependent person.
You're telling me you didn't have any reason to believe
he was drug dependent?
14
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A.
Q.
A,
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
him when
Q.
A.
THE
narcotic
MR.
THE
THE
told?
THE
THE
Schryver

No, I did not.
So you're not making an admission here —
No.
— that you thought he was?
No, not at all.
You don't know whether he is?
Other than the fact that they told me about
they came in.
"They" who?
Mr. Prisk.
WITNESS: And who was with you? Was the
with you?
PRISK: Nick Sweat.
WITNESS: Oh, yes, there he is.
COURT: So from other sources you've been
WITNESS: Yes.
COURT: Perhaps not on your observation of Mr.
THE WITNESS: No.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The order was not justified by the findings of fact in that
revocation of Pickett's license to dispense controlled substances
is tantamount to depriving him of his lifetime profession for
dispensing therapeutic doses of drugs to one, long-time customer
who was entitled to the drugs by physicians' diagnosis and oral
approval of refills.

The order is thus arbitrary and capricious

particularly when compared to penalties imposed in other cases
involving licensed pharmacists.
The Director who signed the Order, was present at the
proceedings and participated in the examination of the
petitioner. Therefore, the Director was an advocate, not a
tribunal, and Pickett was deprived of due process.
The presence and participation of the Director unduly
influenced the findings, conclusions and recommended order.
15
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The findings were not made and signed by the presiding
officer who was the ALJ designated to conduct the proceeding as
required by Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10(l) (1988), they
appear to have been unsigned Findings, Conclusions &.
Recommendations of the Board.

ARGUMENT
I. THE AGENCY ACTION OF REVOCATION IS CONTRARY TO THE
AGENCY'S PRIOR PRACTICE AND IS DISCRIMINATORY, ARBITRARY,
AND CAPRICIOUS.
The standard of review of the final action of the Agency is
set forth in the statute creating review of formal adjudicative
proceedings of administrative agencies.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-16(4)(e) and (h) (1988) state that the appellate court
shall grant relief where upon the record it is determined that
the person seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by
unlawful procedure, abuse of discretion or where the agency
action is otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

See D.B. v. Div. of

Occupational Pro. Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah App.
1989).
A.

Unlawful Procedure

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16(2)(a) (1988) provides that all
adjudicative proceedings shall be held before an appropriate
presiding officer, as designated by the director.

"Presiding

officer" is defined in § 63-46b-2(h) as "an agency head or an
individual or body of individuals designated by the agency head
. . . to conduct an adjudicative proceeding."

"Agency head" is
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defined as the individual in "whom the ultimate legal authority
of the agency is vested by statute."

Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-2

(Supp. 1990) creates a Department of Commerce with six divisions,
one of which is the Division of Occupational and Professional
licensing.

The Department of Commerce is stated to be under the

supervision, direction and control of the executive director of
commerce who is therefore, apparently the "Agency head".
Code Ann. § 13-1-3 (Supp. 1990) and 58-1-2 (1989).

Utah

The director

of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
("Division") is appointed by the executive director, Utah Code
Ann. § 58-1-4 (1985), who is also responsible to appoint a board
of five persons for each profession or occupation licensed, a
majority of whom constitute a quorum. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-7
(1985).
In this case the agency failed to follow proper procedure
and thereby substantially prejudiced Pickett.

The "Notice of

Agency Action" designated J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law
Judge, Department of Commerce as the presiding officer (R 67).
The presiding officer is responsible for signing and issuing an
order which includes his findings of fact, conclusions of law,
reasons for his decision, relief ordered by the agency, and
information of the right for administrative or judicial review.
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-10 (1988).

In the Pickett case,

there were two board members present with the ALJ and Director
Robinson.

Pickett consented to a hearing with only two board

members but did not waive consideration by a quorum of the board
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R 35).

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommended

Order were recited as being "By The Board" but were issued
unsigned (R 35-43).

The Order revoking Pickett's license was

signed by the division director, Robinson, wherein he adopted the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law And Recommended Order
attached to his Order.

This appears to be contrary to the

requirements of § 63-46b-10 which places responsibility upon the
ALJ as presiding officer to sign the findings and order.

In

absence of signing by the ALJ there is no record proof that the
findings and order were not solely those of the division director
who was neither authorized by law, nor by reason of his
adversarial activity, entitled to usurp the statutory authority
vested in the "presiding officer."

Pickett filed a "Request For

Review of Agency Action" and alleged therein as grounds for
review that the findings and order were not signed by the
presiding officer; the presence of the Director and his position
as an advocate rather than as an impartial tribunal deprived
Pickett of due process; and the presence and participation of the
director unduly influenced the order (R 32).
B.

Due Process

As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 855 (1979)
due process requires that the tribunal be a fair and impartial
one, and this requirement also applies to administrative
hearings.

The United States Supreme Court in Withron v. Larkin,

421 U.S. 35, 43 L. Ed. 2d. 712, 95 S. Ct. 1256 (1975), held that
a state board, which conducted preliminary investigative
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

proceedings against a physician to revoke his license, was not
precluded from conducting a subsequent adjudicative hearing, in
absence of specific foundation that the board was prejudiced by
its investigation to the extent it would impugn the board's
fairness at a later adversary hearing.

See Id., 421 U.S. at 55.

However the Court did state that:
Clearly, if the initial view of the facts based on the
evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a
practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective
consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading
to ultimate decision, a substantial due process
question would be raised.
Id. at 58.
The Court's footnoted comment also cited Supreme Court cases
which held that when review of an initial decision is mandated,
the decision maker must be other than the one who made the
decision under review.

The agency head, Executive Director

Buhler, review the Order signed by the division director,
Robinson, and upheld the Order of his appointee division
director, in its entirety without further hearing or independent
consideration (R 8).

This amounts to a decision maker evaluating

his own prior decisions.

An impartial independent reviewer may

have been more inclined to modify the penalty to one more fitting
to the Pickett defaults which were essentially harmless
negligence in distributing tranquilizers to one, long-time
customer who had a prescription and verbal refill orders from
physicians.
C.

Penalty is Discriminatory, Arbitrary and Capricious

The Executive Director, Buhler, adopted the Findings of Fact
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of the "Board" (R 2).

The findings as reviewed above and as

recited by the Executive Director were that on twelve occasions
Pickett dispensed prescription drugs without a physician's
advance authorization or without proper labels, to one customer
(R 2-3).

Pickett does not dispute the facts set forth in the

Findings of Facts.

Pickett cites as error the penalties imposed

as set forth in the Conclusion of Law and the Order of revocation
as being discriminatory when compared to penalties recorded in
previous Agency actions as summarized by Pickett (R 10-12):
1.

Case: William Edmund Leatherwood #OPL-86-72.

Leatherwood and Hyland Drug admitted that from June 1985 to
June 1986, he repeatedly sold controlled substances without a
valid physician prescription and repeatedly signed prescription
forms for the files, and falsely represented that a physician
authorized the same.
Penalty:

Two year suspension and five years probation,

which was amended by the Board following a hearing on October 28,
1987, terminating the suspension.
2.

Case: Richard Ernest Lee #OPL-89-39.

Lee continued to dispense prescription drugs while on
suspension.
Penalty:

Revocation held in abeyance in favor of one-year

suspension and probation.

Supervision terminated before

expiration of one year.
3.

Case: H. John March #OPL-88-78.

March distributed cocaine to practitioners without
20
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documenting transfer on DEA Order Forms between 1982 and 1987; he
also acknowledged some 20 other violations including one third
degree felony of forged prescription for a controlled substance.
Penalty:

License suspended for 70 days and denied ability

to dispense drugs or have access to drugs, but could work
otherwise as a pharmacist.
4.

Case: Robert Riches Hunter #OPL-88-29.

Hunter admitted having over billed Medicaid for
prescriptions on 12 occasions for three different customers, and
pleaded "no contest" to Medicaid fraud, a class B misdemeanor.
Penalty:
5.

Probation which was terminated 14 months later.

Case: Donald Albert Truman, et al. #OPL-88-41.

Respondents dispensed 3,964 doses of Fiorinal to one
customer over an 18 month period, many of which were unauthorized
refills.
Penalty:
6.

Three years probation.

Case: Bruce Alan Danianovich #OPL-86-13.

Respondent brought doses of Tiunol, Ritalin, Numbutal, Opium
and Cocaine from a pharmacy in New Mexico to his residence in
Utah and distributed them to a person to sell to the public. He
entered pleas of guilty to two Class A misdemeanors.
Penalty:
7.

License suspended for three months.

Case: Jimmie N. Anderson #OPL-87-113.

Respondent dispensed Tylenol #3 to a customer without
physicians authorization on 35 occasions and using fictitious
prescriptions.

He entered a guilty plea in federal court for
21
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unlawful distribution of a controlled substance.
Penalty:
8.

One year probation.

Case: Dale D. Bainf et al. #OPL-89-26.

Respondents made false medicaid claims and entered pleas of
guilty to a Class B Misdemeanor.
Penalty:
9.

Probation 10 months.

Case: Randy T. Tippetts #OPL-88-79.

Tippetts personally used Didrex from store inventory which
was discovered during audits in 1988 showing 2,124 tablets
missing from inventory.
Penalty:

Tippetts acknowledged a drug problem.

6 months suspension, with 3 months stayed; 5 years

probation.
10.

Case: Clyde Hans Nielsen #OPL-87-82.

Nielsen on several occasions dispenses Limbitrol, Zyloprin,
Soma, Elavil and Darvacet to two different customers without
practitioners's authorization to do so, and in three instances
created false prescriptions.
Penalty:

Three years probation.

Addressing Pickett's claim that the revocation penalty was
too severe, the Executive Director wrote: (R 5-6)
Respondent points out certain factors in Respondent's
favor:
a. Pharmacy is Respondent's lifetime profession;
b. He was adjudged to have dispensed improperly
only to one long-time customer, who arguably had oral
approval from a physician for the refills;
c. The penalty is more severe than penalties in
other cases.
The Executive Director then referred to the cases cited by
Pickett which the Agency had previously brought against other
22
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pharmacists with penalties which were less than revocation and
noted that the cases were somewhat old, the most recent being
three years old.

He then briefly referred to other cases not

cited by Pickett: a 1985, indefinite suspension by stipulation; a
1986 default revocation of a pharmacist; and a 1988 case of a
pharmacist's license suspended by stipulation.

The Executive

Director then stated: "Finally, where the Board, the
Administrative Law Judge and Director were present at the
hearing, heard the testimony and were able to observe the
Respondent's demeanor, and found that restrictions were necessary
to protect the public health, safety and welfare, the sanction
should not be overturned or modified unless a compelling reason
can be demonstrated." (R 7).
Demeanor may be of some value in assessing truth of
statements in preparation of Findings of Fact, although in some
instances observation of demeanor, or a person whose appearance
does not impress a finder favorably, results in unfair
discrimination.

There should have been nothing in the

observation of demeanor that should have bolstered the penalty
above that which the written findings would suggest.

The written

findings related to one customer possessing a prescription for
tranquilizers, non-hardcore drugs, which were refilled mostly
with oral approval of the physician at one clinic.

It is

difficult to imagine that observation of Pickett's demeanor, in
testifying as set forth in the transcript, could be so construed
as to justify revocation "to protect the public health, safety
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and welfare."

The "Board Finding" essentially negated public

harm in paragraph 4 of its findings:
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent has
improperly dispensed controlled substances or other
medications to other individuals. Respondent assets he
has taken remedial measures to address the acknowledged
deficiencies in his practices now under review.
However, there is a lack of substantial evidence as to
the specific nature of corrective measures Respondent
may have undertaken in that regard."
(R 37).
To be upheld on appeal, where the agency action is contrary
to the agency's prior practice, the agency must justify "the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency."

A reference to

Pickett's demeanor is not sufficient justification for the
penalty imposed.
II.

THERE WAS NO BOARD CONCURRENCE WITH THE DIRECTOR'S
WRITTEN ORDER.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16(2)(c) (1988) requires concurrence
with the "appropriate board" of the director's written order:
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on
the recommendations (of the presiding officer) but is
not bound to follow the recommendations of the
presiding officer.
Neither the Order of the Executive Director dated July 30, 1992
(R 8) nor the Order of the director of the division of
Occupational & Professional Licensing dated June 24, 1992 (R 34),
indicated any concurrence by the State Board of Pharmacy, the
appropriate board.

Although the written Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order are prefaced as being
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"By the Board" there is no signature of anyone appended thereto
(R 35-43).
that:

In any event Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-16(2)(b) states

"(b) The presiding officer shall make written

recommendations for action, findings of fact and conclusions of
law."
CONCLUSION
The cause should be remanded to the Agency to eliminate the
revocation portion of the Order.
Dated this 6P

day of November, 1992.

Georije K. Fadel
Attorney for Petitioners
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BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF JACK W. PICKETT TO
PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND TO
DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
AND THE LICENSES OF
SERVUS DRUG CO. AS A PHARMACY
AND AS A DISPENSARY FOR
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON REVIEW
CASE NO. OPL-92-6

INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 1992, following a hearing on a petition involving
Jack W. Pickett and Servus Drug Co. ("Respondents") before the
Administrative Law Judge and the State Board of Pharmacy, the
Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
(the "Division") adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Recommended Order of the Board.

The Order revoked Respondent

Pickett's license to dispense controlled substances and placed his
license as a pharmacist on probation for three years, subject to
certain terms and conditions.

Respondent was represented by an

attorney throughout the proceeding, as well as on review.

He

requested agency review on July 1, 1992, and also was given until
July 27, 1992, to supplement his brief requesting review.

Oral

argument was neither requested nor held.
In his request for review, Respondent requests that the Order
be modified so that he may continue as a licensed pharmacist.
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STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of

Procedure

for

Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.
THE ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether the Order contains procedural defects sufficient

to warrant overturning it;
2.

Whether

Respondent

was

unfairly

deprived

of

a

fair

hearing where the Division Director was present and participated in
questioning Respondent, thus either becoming an "advocate"1 rather
than a "tribunal", or unduly influencing the Recommended Order;
3.

Whether the Order is not supported by the Findings of

Fact; and
4.

Whether

the

Order

of

revocation

was

arbitrary

and

capricious, particularly when compared with penalties in other
cases.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent does not contest the Findings of Fact entered

into by the Board, and consequently they are adopted herein for
purposes of this review.
2.

The Order found that Respondent has engaged in acts or

conduct which violated §58-17-10 (1) (m) ; §58-17-22 (8) ; and Rule 15317-12.

Specifically, it found that Respondent had, on twelve

occasions,
substances,

dispensed
as well

authorization,

or

Schedule
as

a

without

IV

legend
proper

and

Schedule

drug, without
labels,

to

III
a
one
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controlled
physician's
customer.

Respondent apparently acknowledged that his prescriptive practices
were improper and that he did not adequately document dispensing
certain drugs.

The Findings concluded that there was a lack of

sufficient evidence to find that Respondent made false or forged
prescriptions, as had been charged in the Petition.
3.

Respondent argues as grounds for review that the Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order were not signed
by the presiding officer.

They were in fact not signed by either

the Board or the Administrative Law Judge. The Order adopting the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommended Order was signed by the
Division Director.
4.

The Director was present at the hearing.

However, the

limited record available for review does not indicate what, if any,
questions were put to Respondent, or any other witness, by the
Director. No evidence or transcripts were produced by Respondent,
or arguments made, which would enable a determination to be made as
to whether or not the Director acted as an advocate, or whether his
presence unduly influenced the process.
5.

Respondent does not indicate which portions of the Order

are not supported by the Findings of Fact.
6.

Respondent supplemented the request for review by listing

ten cases previously decided by the Division and Board against
other pharmacists, in which the penalties were less than those in
this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In Respondent's request for review, he cites no statutory
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4
or

other

authority

for

the

proposition

that

the Findings,

Conclusions and Recommended Order must be signed by the Board or
the Administrative Law Judge.

The procedure does not appear to

violate the Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), which, at §6346b-10, requires that in formal proceedings, the presiding officer
shall sign and issue the order. In this case, the order was signed
and issued by the division director, who was the
officer1" for purposes of overseeing the proceedings.

"presiding
Pursuant to

§58-1-16(2), the director may designate a presiding officer in
disciplinary proceedings, which shall make written recommendations,
findings

of

fact and conclusions

of

law.

For purposes of

conducting a hearing and making recommendations, the director
designated the Board as the "presiding officer".
requirement that the recommendation be signed.

There is no
The procedure

followed herein, where the Division Director signed the final Order
adopting the Board's recommendations was not improper.
2.

Whether

the

Director's

presence

and

participation

constituted his an "advocate" is a contention which appears to be
without merit.

As noted above, Respondent produced no evidence,

transcripts or arguments which would assist in reviewing this
issue.

Without such a showing, the Director's participation, if

any, cannot be deemed to have been improper in any way, nor can it
be declared to have unduly influenced the Board's recommendations.
Common practice is for the Board to deliberate without the presence
of the Director; there was no evidence presented by Respondent as
to whether or not this in fact occurred -- nor that it would be
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5

improper even if it had.

If the Director were not present at the

hearing, or not asking questions, could Respondent have raised the
argument that he was thus not qualified to judge the case?
3.

Respondent next argues that the Order is not supported by

the findings of fact.

It is difficult to evaluate Respondent's

claim where he does not contest the findings, and provides no
specific statements of where the findings may be deficient.
undisputed

facts

can be

summarized

as

follows:

The

Respondent

dispensed dosages of a Schedule IV controlled substance, a Schedule
III controlled substance and a legend drug, either without a
physician's authorization, or dispensed them in unlabeled vials or
in a paper bag with no labels or instructions.

These findings

constitute a legally sufficient basis for the Order.

Section 58-

17-9 provides that the Division may suspend, revoke or restrict a
pharmacist's license for violating the law.
17-10(1)

specifically

makes

it

a

Further, Section 58-

violation

to

dispense

a

prescription drug without a prescription, or to fail to properly
label prescriptions.
4.

Finally, Respondent

argues

that

the Order revoking

Respondent's controlled substance license, and imposing a three
year probation on this pharmacist's

license, is too severe.

Respondent points out certain factors in Respondent's favor:
a.

Pharmacy is Respondent's lifetime profession;

b.

He was adjudged to have dispensed improperly only to

one long-time customer, who arguably had oral approval from a
physician for the refills;
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c.

The penalty is more severe than penalties in other

cases.
5.

Two separate penalties are at issue here. The first one,

revocation

of

Respondent's

controlled

substance

license,

is

mitigated somewhat by two factors. The Order allows Respondent to
employ another pharmacist, under Board supervision, to establish
controls with respect

to controlled

substances.

Second, an

examination of prior cases reveals that the Division and Board on
occasion entertain requests to reinstate licenses.

The second

penalty, a three-year probation of Respondent's pharmacist license,
was not

the most

harsh

that

the Order

could have

imposed;

subsection 58-17-11 also allows the division to suspend or revoke
a license. With probation, Respondent can continue practicing as
a pharmacist, subject to Board supervision -- he simply cannot
personally dispense controlled substances.
6*

Of the other Division proceedings against pharmacists

cited by Respondent, such precedent is of limited value for several
reasons.

The cases cited are somewhat old: the most recent are

approximately three years old; other cases are as many as six years
old.

An examination of the cases cited by Respondent, as well as

others, yields more information not disclosed in the request for
review.

Note, for example, that the Leatherwood and Anderson

orders, cited by Respondent, were pursuant to stipulation of the
parties.

(Also, Respondent omits to mention that Leatherwood's

penalty actually was revocation, which was stayed in favor of
suspension and probation) . In the Nielson case, the license of the
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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pharmacy itself, a corporation, was placed on probation, which was
not the case in the order under review here.

In other cases not

cited by Respondent, severe sanctions were entered:
see

Morrison, No. 85-63

(license indefinitely

for example,
suspended by

stipulation); Jensen, No. 86-05 (default revocation of pharmacist
and controlled substance licenses); Evans, No. 88-20 (pharmacist
license suspended, controlled substance license surrendered, by
stipulation).

In addition, as pointed out by counsel for Division

in its Response to the request for review, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a sanction is not invalid only because it is more
severe than sanctions in other cases.

Finally, where the Board,

the Administrative Law Judge and Director were present at the
hearing,

heard

the

testimony

and

were

able

to

observe the

Respondent's demeanor, and found that restrictions were necessary
to protect the public health, safety and welfare, the sanction
should not be overturned or modified unless a compelling reason can
be demonstrated.
7.

In support of the penalty, the Order found that:
a.

"Respondent should have known

attempting

to

obtain

misrepresentation."
b.

drugs

by

[the patient] was
either

fraud

or

(Recommended Order, page 6)

"Respondent violated R153-17-12(2) when he prepared

documents to purportedly reflect a physician's authorization
for the medication which was dispensed when, in fact, no
authorization was made." (Page 6)
c.

Respondent engaged in "unprofessional conduct", was
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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8
"grossly negligent" (page 6); his conduct was an "egregious
departure from those standards which govern his profession",
and he engaged in such misconduct on "numerous occasions"
(page 7 ) .
8.

Respondent's request on review that the Order be modified

so he can "continue as a licensed pharmacist" indicates an apparent
misunderstanding of the Order.

Under that order, Respondent can

continue: his license to practice as a pharmacist is placed on
probation

and

subject

to various

conditions, but he

is not

forbidden to practice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The order is upheld in its entirety.

Pursuant to Rule 151-

46b-12, the effective date of that order is ten days from the date
that this order on review is mailed.
Dated this

7^

day of July, 1992.

David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any Petition for such Review must comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the ^
day of July, 1992, I caused
to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on
Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to:
Respondent:
Jack W. Pickett
Servus Drug Co.
55 North Main Street
Bountiful, UT 84010
Attorney for Respondent:
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84010
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
David E. Robinson, Director
Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
P.O Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Delia Welch, Assistant A.G.
Beneficial Life Tower
11th Floor
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
JACK W. PICKETT
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
AND THE LICENSES OF
8ERVUS DRUG CO.
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN
THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER

Case No. OPL-92-6

The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of
Utah.

Respondent Jack W. Pickett's license to dispense

controlled substances is thus revoked, effective thirty (30) days
from the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revoked license, both wall
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.
Dated this

day of June, 1992.

David E. Robinson
Director

' ^^^^dmini^trative review of this Order may be obtained by
filing a request for agency review with the executive director of
the department within thirty (30) days after issuance of this
Order. Any such request must comply with the requirements of the
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental
rules which govern agency review.
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
JACK W. PICKETT
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
AND THE LICENSES OF
SERVUS DRUG CO.
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN
THE STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. OPL-92-6

Appearances:
Delia M. Welch for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
George K. Fadel for Respondents
BY THE BOARD:
A hearing was conducted in the above-entitled matter on May
26, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the Department of Commerce, and the State Board of Pharmacy.
Board members present for the hearing were Dennis R. White and
Don Sterling.

The remaining Board members, Frank Morris, Mark L.

Johnson and Delbert A. Park, were absent.

David E. Robinson, the

Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, was present.

Respondents consented that the hearing

be conducted as scheduled, despite the lack of a majority of
Board members present for the hearing.

Thereafter, evidence was

offered and received.
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The Board, being fully advised in the premises, now enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent Jack W. Pickett (hereinafter, Respondent) is,

and at all times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed
to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances
in the State of Utah.

Respondent has been a licensed pharmacist

since approximately 1954. Respondent Servus Drug Co.
(hereinafter, Servus Drug Co.) is, and at all time relevant to
this proceeding has been, licensed as a pharmacy and a dispensary
for controlled substances in the State of Utah.

This record does

not reflect the exact date those licenses were issued.
Respondent is employed by Servus Drug Co., a business which is
owned by Respondent's wife.
2.

On twelve occasions between May 20, 1991 and July 30,

1991, Respondent dispensed various dosages of either Tranxene, a
Schedule IV controlled substance, Esgic, a Schedule III
controlled substance, or Soma, a legend drug, to a Todd Schriver.
In certain instances, Respondent dispensed those controlled
substances without a physician's authorization to do so. On
occasion, Respondent dispensed medications in either unlabeld
prescription vials or a paper bag bearing no labels or
instructions.
3.

There is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent made

false or forged prescriptions as to dispense the above-stated
controlled substances or other medications.

Further, there is a

lack of sufficient evidence to conclude Respondent knew Mr.
2
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Schriver was drug dependent.

Respondent acknowledges his

prescriptive practices were improper and he failed to adequately
document the controlled substances or other medications which he
dispensed.

Respondent often dispensed those controlled

substances or other medications in the manner requested by Mr.
Schriver, who often suggested the use of either unlabeled vials
or other inappropriate containers.
4.

There is no substantial evidence Respondent has

improperly dispensed controlled substances or other medications
to other individuals.

Respondent asserts he has taken remedial

measures to address the acknowledged deficiencies in his
practices now under review.

However, there is a lack of

substantial evidence as to the specific nature of corrective
measures Respondent may have undertaken in that regard.
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-17-9 provides the Division, in
collaboration with the Board, may suspend, revoke or restrict the
license of a pharmacist on one or more of the following grounds:
(5) being found by the board to be in
violation of this chapter or rules adopted
under this chapter;
(6) acts of unprofessional conduct as
defined by statute or by rule of the
division, in collaboration with the board, as
follows:
. . . .

(g) violation of the federal
Controlled Substance Act, the Utah
Controlled Substance Act, or rules
and regulations adopted under
either of them.
Section 58-17-10(1) provides it is unlawful for any person to:

3
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(m) dispense a prescription drug to anyone
who does not have a prescription from a
practitioner or to anyone who he knows or
should know is attempting to obtain drugs by
fraud or misrepresentation.
Section 58-17-22 further provides:
(8) Each drug or device dispensed shall
have a label securely affixed to the
container indicating the following:
(a) the name, address, and
telephone number of the pharmacy;
(b) the serial number;
« . . .

(d) the name of the patient . .
(e) the name of the prescriber;
(f) the directions for use and
cautionary statements, if any,
which are contained in the
prescription order or are needed;
(g) the trade, generic or
chemical name, amount dispensed and
strength of dosage form, but if
multiple ingredient products with
established proprietary or
nonproprietary names are
prescribed, those products7 names
may be used.
R153-17-12 of the rules which govern the practice of pharmacy
further define unprofessional conduct to include:
(1) Violating any federal or state statute
or rule dealing with controlled substances or
other drugs;
(2) Fraud or deception in the practice of
pharmacy;
(3) Negligence or incompetence in the
practice of pharmacy.
With respect to a license to dispense controlled substances,
Section 58-37-6(4)(a) provides such a license "may be suspended,
placed on probation, or revoked" by the department upon finding
that the licensee has:

4
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(vi) violated any department rule that
reflects adversely on the licensee's
reliability and integrity with respect to
controlled substances;
In addition to the acts and practices set forth in the juststated statute, R156-37-9 provides the Division may revoke,
suspend, restrict or place on probation a controlled substance
license if the licensee:
(2) has violated any federal or state law
relating to controlled substances;
• • • •

(7) violates restrictions upon controlled
substances, prescriptions and administration
as contained in these rules; and/or
(8) knowingly prescribes, sells, gives
away or administers, directly or indirectly,
or offers to prescribe, sell, furnish, give
away, or administer any controlled substance
to a drug dependent person, as defined in
Utah Code Ann., 58-37-2(14), except for
legitimate medical purposes as permitted by
law.
Section 58-37-6(7)(a) provides:
No person may write or authorize a
prescription for a controlled substance
unless he is:
(i) a practitioner authorized to
prescribe drugs and medicine under
the laws of this state or under the
laws of another state having
similar standards; and
(ii) licensed under this chapter
or under the laws of another state
having similar standards.
Section 58-37-6(7)(c) further provides:
(i) No controlled substance may be
dispensed without the written prescription of
a practitioner, if the written prescription
is required by the federal Controlled
Substances Act.
Section 58-37-8(3)(a) also provides it is unlawful for any
person:
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(i) who is subject to this chapter to
distribute or dispense a controlled substance
in violation of this chapter;
Finally, Section 58-37-8(4)(a) provides it is unlawful for any
person knowingly and intentionally:
(iii) to make any false or forged
prescription or written order for a
controlled substance,, or to utter the same,
or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this
chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent
material information in any application,
report, or other document required to be kept
by this chapter or to willfully make any
false statement in any prescription, order,
report, or record required by this chapter;
Respondent violated Section 58-17-10(1)(m) when he dispensed
prescription drugs and controlled substances without any
practitioner's authorization to do so.

Under the circumstances,

Respondent should have known Mr. Schriver was attempting to
obtain drugs by either fraud or misrepresentation.

Respondent

failed to comply with Section 58-17-22(8) when he dispensed drugs
in containers without appropriate labeling.

Respondent violated

R153-17-12(2) when he prepared documents to purportedly reflect a
physician's authorization for the medication which was dispensed
when, in fact, no authorization was made.
Respondent also violated Section 58-37-6(7)(a) and Section
58-37-6(7)(c)(i).

By reason thereof, Respondent engaged in

unprofessional conduct, as defined in R153-17-12(1).

He was also

grossly negligent in his practice of pharmacy, which reflects
unprofessional conduct with respect to R153-17-12(3).

However,

there is a lack of sufficient evidence to find and thus conclude
Respondent violated Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) or (iv).
6
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Thus, Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct and a
proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect
to his licensure as a pharmacist and his ability to dispense
controlled substances in this state. However, no proper basis
exists to enter any disciplinary sanction with respect to the
license of Servus Drug Co. as a pharmacy or a dispensary of
controlled substances.
Respondents misconduct represents an egregious departure
from those standards which govern his profession.

Further,

Respondent engaged in such misconduct on numerous occasions.
Respondent's conduct does not merely reflect a singular,
haphazard exercise of his duties as a pharmacist. Rather,
Respondent repeatedly failed to properly dispense controlled
substances and other medication.

Various statutes and rules

appropriately restrict the manner in which controlled substances
may be dispensed, yet Respondent frequently failed to comply with
the requirements of those statutes and rules.
Therefore, an appropriately severe sanction should enter
with regard to Respondent's license to dispense controlled
substances.

Further, adequate restrictions must exist to

appropriately protect the public health, safety and welfare and
ensure Respondent continually complies with those standards which
govern his profession.

The recommended order set forth below is

thus necessary to adequately monitor Respondent's future conduct
as a pharmacist, to appropriately prompt necessary corrective and
remedial action required of Respondent and to ensure controlled
substances are dispensed in a manner consistent with the dictates
7
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of state and federal law.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to dispense
controlled substances is revoked.
It is further ordered Respondent's license as a pharmacist
be placed on probation for three (3) years, subject to the
following terms and conditions:
1. Within thirty (30) days from the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the
Director of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, Respondent shall
submit a written practice plan, which shall
be subject to Board review and approval.
Said plan shall provide for another
pharmacist to be employed by Servus Drug Co.
Said pharmacist shall thereafter establish
proper record keeping, inventory control and
dispensary procedures for controlled
substances at the pharmacy.
2. Respondent and the just-referenced
pharmacist shall initially meet with the
Board each month during the first three (3)
months of this probationary term.
Thereafter, Respondent and the pharmacist
shall meet with the Board every six (6)
months. During those meetings, the Board
will review the ongoing efforts to implement
proper record keeping practices, appropriate
management of controlled substance inventory
and proper procedures with regard to any
controlled substances which are dispensed
through the pharmacy in question.
3. The Division shall periodically audit
the controlled substance records of Servus
Drug Co.
4. Within ninety (90) days from the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted,
Respondent shall successfully complete the
jurisprudence examination generally required
of all pharmacists licensed to practice in
this state.
Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and
8
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43
conditions set forth herein, or otherwise violate any statute or
rule which governs his license as a pharmacist, further
proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether a
sanction of greater severity than that set forth herein is
warranted.

9
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
^/
day of June, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, RECOMMENDED ORDER AND ORDER was sent first
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jack W. Pickett
Servus Drug
55 North Main
Bountiful, UT 84010
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful Ut 84010

C^MH itfMkllfWr.
•r!

Carol W. Inglesby *
Administrative Assistant
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